The Afghanistan Plan 2013-2014
Towards full Afghan responsibility
Map: NATO

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Front page and back page: ISAF Media
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1. Introduction

Denmark has been firmly engaged in Afghanistan for the past ten years both politically, militarily and through development assistance. Together with our close allies and within the coalition of ISAF countries, we continue to pursue the interests of Afghanistan, the international community and to a high degree Denmark by fighting those forces in Afghanistan who for a period of time made the country a safe haven for organisations like Al-Qaeda, who see countries of the Western world, among them Denmark, as targets for terrorist actions.

The Afghanistan Plan 2013-2014 is about making sure that the Afghans in the coming years attain the ability to keep the country safe from international terrorist organisations on their own, and about supporting the Afghans in the creation of a civil society that benefits the common citizen in Afghanistan.

Developments in 2013 and 2014 will be important for Afghanistan. These will be the years when Afghanistan together with the international community, including Denmark, must lay the stepping-stones that will help make Afghan systems sufficiently robust and sustainable for the country to take the crucial steps to cope on its own after 2014. This does not mean that the work can be completed in the next two years – there will be a need for international assistance to Afghanistan for many years to come. However, it does mean that after 2014 the responsibility for the country’s security and its political, economic and social development must
lie firmly with the Afghans themselves. Therefore, our role will increasingly be one of training, advising and assisting the Afghans.

For Denmark this means that work will continue based on the foundation laid out in the latest Helmand Plan for 2011-2012 and the Afghanistan Strategy for 2008-2012: In military terms we must continue the shift from the role of combat and partnering forces to a role of training, advising and assisting towards the end of 2014 when the Afghans themselves will take over the full responsibility for security country-wide. This means that we will continue to restructure and downsize the Danish troop contingent, so that by the end of 2014, Denmark will no longer have combat troops in Afghanistan. The Danish military presence after 2014 will be negotiated by the parties to this agreement during 2014 and will primarily consist of advisors, instructors and assistance contributions.

At the same time, we will enhance the civilian efforts, which carry a more long-term perspective than the military efforts. If we are to secure a stable development in Afghanistan in the long term, it is crucial that the international community continues its support for the political, social and economic development of the country. There can be no development without security. Similarly, there is no doubt that security cannot be sustained without development.


The overarching international framework for the Danish military and civilian efforts in 2013-2014 has been clearly set out. The international community and Afghanistan have in 2011 and 2012 through four international conferences in Bonn, Chicago, Kabul and Tokyo agreed the political, security-related and developmental frameworks for the international support to Afghanistan’s development. These frameworks cover the period leading up to the end of 2014 as well as the decade thereafter – the so-called Transformation Decade.

The Danish engagement in the coming years will be based on expectations of continued progress combined with a realistic sense of what is possible to achieve in Afghanistan in the short term, as well as by the understanding that setbacks will be inevitable on Afghanistan’s path towards further stability and development – including in key areas such as security, governance, corruption and human rights. The essence of this is for the Afghan authorities, supported by the international community, to become able to cope with these challenges in a sufficiently effective and appropriate way.

Even with significant international support until and after 2014, there is no doubt that the Afghan Government will be faced with a large and difficult task
in the coming years and in the time after 2014. Not least the presidential elections, expected to take place on 5 April 2014, will be very consequential in terms of political developments in the country, and thereby also for a successful transition of the security responsibility, and for continued international development assistance during the critical years following 2014. Thus, despite positive developments it is broadly recognized that Afghanistan will need significant international support in the coming years in order for the Afghan authorities to be able to maintain security in the country and to continue to provide basic services to the population.

The Danish efforts in 2013 and 2014 will be based on three general principles: We will establish realistic expectations and focus on the **consolidation** of civilian and military efforts in order to reinforce the progress already achieved. We will place a decisive emphasis on **Afghan ownership** in order for responsibility in all areas to be transferred formally and effectively to the Afghans – even if in the short term this means less efficient solutions than those that can be implemented with international assistance today. And we will work to **normalize cooperation** between Afghan authorities and the international community, directing them towards a more traditional and long-term developmental cooperation framework, thereby working decidedly towards reducing the Afghan authorities’ dependency on international support and assistance.

Leading up to the end of 2014, Denmark **will neither be among the first, nor among the last** to reduce its military contribution in Afghanistan. Concurrently with the reduction of the military presence, the Danish military efforts will be restructured. Where Danish efforts have hitherto been focused on **combat, support and training**, they will be concentrated on **training, advice and assistance** in the future. As this happens, a gradual shift in the geographic focus of the Danish military effort will take place, as the previous effort in the Helmand province is reduced in favour of support and advice at central levels. The Danish civilian presence in Helmand will similarly be phased out.
over time. Until 2014, Denmark will, however, earmark a part of its development assistance to the Helmand province in order to consolidate the progress that has been made there under difficult conditions.

To ensure that the Danish efforts in Afghanistan are in line with developments in the country leading up to 2014, the Danish efforts will be flexible and therefore adaptable to changing circumstances and able to meet the need for efficient coordination with Afghan authorities, close coalition partners and other key players. The military presence of the United States and the United Kingdom along with the ISAF mission will remain the framework for Denmark’s military engagement in 2013-2014. Flexibility will also be required in the implementation of the development assistance, so as to allow that resources are always utilized to the maximum effect and that developments in the country are taken into consideration.

Long-term financing of the Afghan security forces is essential to ensure that the Afghans become capable of taking responsibility for their own security beyond 2014. The NATO summit in Chicago was successful in creating the foundation for long-term financing of the capacity building of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Denmark played a key role with its 3C initiative “Coalition of Committed Contributors” in securing long-term international financing of the Afghan security forces. In Chicago, international donors pledged contributions of more than USD 1 billion. The substantial Danish efforts already made towards enhancing security through training, education and financial support for both the Afghan military and police will be followed up by financial support for the building of Afghan security forces. Towards and beyond 2014, the Danish contribution to the Afghan security forces will increase to a yearly DKK 100 million from 2015-2017.

In the Afghanistan Strategy 2008-2012 we set the goal of gradually shifting the balance towards increased civilian efforts and a more withdrawn military role. The guiding motto has been that the efforts should be as military as necessary – as civilian as possible. Leading up to and beyond 2014, the Danish civilian efforts will therefore naturally move towards the centre of the Danish engagement. In keeping with this and based on the broad political support in the Danish Parliament, the Government has decided to increase development assistance for the period 2013-2017 such that the annual disbursements reach an average of DKK 530 million per year. This will make Afghanistan the largest recipient of Danish development assistance. For this reason, we will in the coming years work to shift to a more traditional development cooperation framework, as we continue to move towards fewer and larger initiatives where we give priority to economic growth and job creation focused on agriculture, education and good governance.

Denmark will together with the international group of donors keep the Afghans to their commitments as set out in the “Mutual Accountability Framework” of the Tokyo Conference about delivering concrete progress in areas such as compliance with human rights, conducting elections and fighting corruption. It will be central for Danish assistance that
Afghanistan meets the requirement of fighting corruption. Denmark will not accept corruption or fraud. Irregularities with the Danish development assistance will have consequences for the Danish assistance to Afghanistan. A focused effort will be undertaken to support the mechanisms and institutions that can fight corruption.

Despite real progress made since the fall of the Taleban in 2001, Afghan women continue to suffer discrimination and marginalization in all aspects of society. Together with like-minded partners and donors, Denmark will place an emphasis on Afghanistan’s future as a country that protects the improvements Afghan women have experienced in recent years. Across the entire Danish development efforts, support to the disadvantaged women in Afghanistan will be given priority.

An overarching political agreement achieved through dialogue and reconciliation constitutes an important element of a lasting solution to the challenges in Afghanistan. To this end, Denmark will
continue its support for the Afghan peace and reconciliation process, which aims at forging a solution at a central level between the various groupings in Afghanistan. The reconciliation process will be based on the principles that an overarching political agreement must see all groups renounce violence, cut all ties to international terrorist organisations, just as an agreement must not violate the constitution of Afghanistan. Such an agreement will be crucial for the establishment of a sustainable solution to the situation in Afghanistan. However, it must be stressed that an overarching political agreement is unlikely to take full effect right down to the local level in the short term. Not least in the unsettled Southern and Eastern parts of Afghanistan, local groups of insurgents and criminal networks will continue to use violence as a means to promote their ideological and/or economic interests. It is therefore conceivable that different accommodations and divisions of power will be seen at a local level – arrangements which do not necessarily fit into the peace and reconciliation process and a potential overarching political agreement.

In order to ensure that the groups and movements that pursue war and chaos instead of peace and reconciliation do not gain momentum, it is crucial that the end of 2014 is not perceived as a point in time when the international community turns its back on Afghanistan. This is why Afghanistan urgently needs Denmark and the international community to reaffirm their long-term engagement in Afghanistan for the decade beyond 2014, both in the areas of security and development.

For this reason a component in the implementation of the Afghanistan Plan will be the entering into a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan. The partnership agreement will describe the political, economic, security-related and developmental aspects of the Danish engagement. In turn, the agreement will also place emphasis on the reforms and commitments to be fulfilled by the Afghan Government.
Since the fall of the Taliban the Afghans have experienced substantial improvements in their everyday life. Access to health care services has improved significantly. By 2012, about half of all children in Afghanistan attend school, among them about 40 per cent are girls. Afghanistan has experienced stable economic growth at an average of about 9 per cent per year over the last ten years. Compared to the situation prior to 2001, significant improvements have also taken place in the area of human rights. In today’s Afghanistan many girls attend school, women are represented on the political stage, and the country has a relatively pluralistic media landscape with a fairly extensive freedom of speech.

This positive but fragile progress does, however, also face great challenges, just as there are significant differences between and within each of the provinces. Afghanistan is still among the 10 poorest countries in the world and about 36 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. The country is extremely dependent on international assistance. 70 per cent of the population is under 25. About 30 per cent of Afghans above the age of 15 years can neither read nor write. Despite great progress made in primary education, many young people have no economic opportunities. The capacity of state institutions remains weak, especially at the provincial and district levels, and public authorities depend heavily on advisors financed by donors. An overriding challenge is the lack of progress in...
governance. Among other things, this is true for the formal judicial system and thus for the legal rights of the citizens, and it is true when it comes to the prevailing corruption. Afghanistan remains in a shared last place on the Transparency International corruption index, thereby making it one of the countries facing the biggest problems with corruption. The Afghan Government must therefore take more consistent action to fight corruption.

The vision of the Afghan Government is for Afghanistan to reduce its dependence on international assistance during the so-called Transformation Decade so much that the country reaches the same level as other developing countries, and so that it will be able to finance the majority of its public spending on its own. An ambitious target, which will require significant economic growth.

The World Bank estimates that in the coming years approximately USD 4 billion in assistance will be needed every year in order to sustain the improvements already achieved. At the international donor conference in Tokyo in July 2012, Denmark and the rest of the international community committed to collectively cover this funding gap and to maintaining the high level of development assistance to Afghanistan in the coming years. In turn, the international community insisted that the monetary pledges would come with obligations for the Afghan side to implement reforms and demonstrate tangible progress in a number of key areas, among them democracy, governance, the fight against corruption and respect for human rights. The main result of the Tokyo-conference was a “contract”, the Tokyo Accountability Framework, between the Afghan Government and Afghanistan’s international donors, which

1 Transparency International World Corruption Index 2012. Afghanistan shares the last place with North Korea and Somalia (no. 174 out of 176 countries).
contained mutual obligations. In Tokyo it was firmly established that if the Afghan Government does not deliver on these promises, it may have consequences for the future assistance to the country.

Denmark has committed to increase the assistance provided to Afghanistan from 2013 to an annual average of DKK 530 million until the end of 2017. Several donors have similarly committed to increase the size of their assistance to Afghanistan. Despite these pledges, the level of international assistance to the country is widely expected to drop considerably within a few years. The combination of the expected drop and the drawdown of the military presence will therefore have significant consequences for the Afghan economy, which at this point is driven by the extensive war economy, the high levels of development assistance and the massive presence of donors in the country. It is therefore necessary to identify other sources of economic development and job creation, so that in time, Afghanistan can become less dependent on international assistance.

2.2 MILITARY REDUCTIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY

The development of increasingly more capable Afghan security forces will continue through 2013, where the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are expected to assume the lead responsibility for security across all of Afghanistan by the summer of 2013. By the end of 2014, this trend will culminate in a full takeover of the responsibility for security. As this process comes underway, the international military presence will be reduced, and the efforts will increasingly be focused on a role of training, advising and, in particular, assisting the Afghans. Towards and beyond 2014, international assistance will be necessary in the form of training, advisory and support contributions.

The question of financing the Afghan security forces, i.e. the expenses from the running of and salaries for the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, will be a key issue. There is a broad international recognition of the need for international assistance to maintain a sustainable and adequate ANSF until...
and especially beyond 2014. This was also reflected in the result of the international NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012. With its 3C initiative “Coalition of Committed Contributors”, Denmark has played a leading role in terms of mobilising international funding for the ANSF.

The security situation in Afghanistan continues to present challenges. While the situation in the northern provinces has been substantially improved, realities are different in the South. In the southern provinces the international and Afghan military pressure has limited the insurgents’ freedom of movement and local influence. However, it has not yet resulted in a decisive weakening of the insurgents’ resolve to continue the fight. This situation should be expected to continue. In the East there are still many sanctuaries for the insurgents, just as there are safe havens on the other side of the border with Pakistan.

Particularly during the first half of 2012, the international and Afghan security forces have placed a firm military pressure on the insurgents in the Helmand province. The insurgents do, however, retain a firm hold in the province. While parts of Helmand continue to be the theatre of some of the most intense military operations in the country, the overall security situation has improved in recent years. This has created the foundation for the largest population centres in Helmand to commence the transition process by the end of 2012. The building of the Afghan security forces in the Helmand province is progressing according to plan, and even though there are challenges, there is an increasing number of examples that the Afghan security forces can plan and execute security operations. In September 2012, the US concluded the withdrawal of its temporary reinforcements (“the surge”), which means that the future security efforts will be increasingly focused on Helmand’s central and densely populated districts. Consequently, Afghan security forces are not expected to be able to provide security in the remote districts of Helmand to the same extent as ISAF.

The ISAF troop reductions will not in all places be carried out in phase with a corresponding increase in ANSF troops. This might create a vacuum, which criminal elements or insurgent groups will manage to take advantage of. Setbacks in certain areas, especially in sparsely populated, remote areas in the North and South, cannot be avoided. A murky scenario leading up to 2014 should be expected, with a mosaic of accommodations between local authorities and insurgent groups. Under these circumstances it will, however, be essential that the Afghan authorities become robust enough by the end of 2014 to be able
to handle all security challenges. The building of ANSF capacities is progressing according to plan. Focus has so far primarily been on establishing basic, uncomplicated capacities, i.e. in areas where the need for training and application of advanced technology is limited. An example of this is the infantry units for the Afghan Army, which in many places have reached a level that allows Afghan units to conduct operations independently – or with limited support from ISAF.

The building of technically and operationally more complicated capacities in ANSF is also underway, but these capacities naturally take longer time. One example of this is the Afghan Air Force, where the establishment of fixed and rotary wing capacity will continue until the end of and beyond 2014. Thus, for 2013-2014 and also after 2014 it will be necessary to assist with such capacities. In addition to the building of operational capacities within the ANSF, capacity building also takes place in other places, including under the auspices of the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), which conducts capacity building within the Afghan Ministries of Defence and the Interior, among other things aimed at strengthening civilian control and improving strategic planning. Reforms of the security sector in a broader sense, including at the ministerial levels, will have to be reinforced in 2013-2014 – and during the years after 2014 – if the ANSF are to achieve real sustainability.

While the building of the Afghan army is progressing, the establishment of a functioning Afghan police – which is the face of the Afghan authorities to the population – is a considerably more difficult task. This must, however, be viewed in light of the fact that the international efforts towards training and capacity building of the police were initiated at a later stage than the training of the army. Due to the direct interaction of the Afghan police with the population, strengthening the capacity and legitimacy of the police will be essential in terms of public support for the Afghan authorities.

The overall assessment is that managing the security situation will continue to be challenging and there will be difficult conditions for the ANSF, which is to carry the main responsibility for security. Continued training and advising, as well as support contributions to the Afghan security sector, will be needed during the final and concluding part of the transition phase. Even beyond the transition both training and financial assistance will be crucial for the Afghans’ chances to carry on with the security sector, which has been built up jointly, in the best possible way.

**INSIDER ATTACKS**

The close cooperation between ISAF and the Afghan security forces has proven to involve a risk of the so-called insider attacks. Despite the measures taken, the danger of insurgents infiltrating Afghan security forces and turning against Danish soldiers cannot be excluded. ISAF is very aware that training, education and evaluation efforts may contribute to prevent but not eliminate the risk of losing soldiers, including Danish soldiers.
2.3 EXPECTATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS

NATO leadership of ISAF will continue to be central to the role of the international community in Afghanistan towards the end of 2014. The development of NATO’s plans and the consolidation of these plans in cooperation with Afghan partners will constitute the general framework for the Danish military contribution.

As the transition process moves ahead, the ISAF engagement in Afghanistan will change character and transform into the so-called Security Force Assistance model.

ISAF will gradually step back from the combat role and instead take on a role of advising and assisting in relation to the Afghan security forces towards the end of 2014. NATO’s cooperation with Afghanistan will take place within the framework of a long-term partnership, where collaboration on training and education activities are consolidated and normalized in the long term.

Some uncertainty continues to persist as to how many and which international players will be present in Afghanistan after 2014, and to which extent. Among other things, the security situation will be decisive for the scope of the presence of international organisations in the provinces.

The UN must assume a more central role in Afghanistan as the international engagement changes character and increasingly takes on a developmental and political nature.

The World Bank is one of the most central civilian international organisations in Afghanistan and will play a growing role both towards and even more so beyond 2014. As the bilateral players reduce their presence in Afghanistan and are expected to provide more assistance through the national budget, donors will increasingly look to the World Bank. The World Bank manages the largest multiple-donor trust fund and the largest mechanism for on-budget assistance: The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The trust fund is one of the main instruments in the reconstruction of the Afghan state.

WHAT IS THE SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE MODEL?

The Security Force Assistance model is a gradual development of the role of ISAF units and their cooperation with Afghan security forces throughout the transition process. As the security situation improves and the capacity of the Afghan security forces increases, partner-mentoring between ISAF and ANSF units (e.g. battalion to battalion or platoon to platoon) will be replaced with advising to the higher command staff in the Afghan security forces with a view to handling specific functions, e.g. in fire support and logistics. The gradual reorganization of the Danish military contribution from combat to training and support contributions is fully in keeping with the ISAF Security Force Assistance model.
2.4 POLITICAL TRANSITION, PEACE AND RECONCILIATION, AND REGIONAL PROSPECTS

A sustainable and constructive development depends on political stability, and on a sufficiently broad majority of the population considering the state power legitimate. The coming elections – particularly the next presidential elections planned to take place on 5 April 2014 – will therefore be very important for the future political stability of Afghanistan.-President Karzai’s term in office expires in 2014, and the constitution prohibits him from running for another term. This means that according to plan, Afghanistan will have a new president and a new government in 2014. Parliamentary elections will take place in 2015.

Successful elections and a legitimate transfer of government in Kabul are important stepping-stones towards a successful conclusion of the security transition and a continued stabilization, just as they are crucial for the developmental efforts in the critical years after 2014. Conversely, illegitimate elections – in a country that has previously been

WHAT IS ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE?

On-budget assistance is assistance that is included in the budget of the Afghan Government. However, an agreement is made between the donor and the recipient country about what the money must be spent on within the national priorities. As with all other Danish assistance, agreements about on-budget assistance entail a requirement for auditing the accounts, however, donors may also require further control with the funds, such as special external audits. According to the World Bank, on-budget assistance gives better protection against corruption than traditional assistance that circumvents the national structures, as both the Afghans and the donors take ownership and are attentive to the utilization of on-budget funds. In connection with the Tokyo conference in 2012, the international donor community has committed to providing 50% of the assistance to Afghanistan as on-budget assistance.

and the implementation of public sector reforms. At the same time, the trust fund finances a large part of the public sector’s operating costs.

As one of the most important players on development issues the EU – i.e. the European External Action Service, the Commission and the member states – has a central role to play in Afghanistan in the coming years. With its intention to enter into a 10-year EU-Afghanistan partnership agreement and the pledge to maintain the EU development assistance (bilaterally and through the EU budget) at least at the 2011 level, the EU has sent a strong signal of a long-term engagement in Afghanistan.

In addition, other development players such as the Asian Development Bank as well as donor countries such as China, Turkey and countries of the Gulf Region should be able to take on a greater role in Afghanistan in the coming years.
marked by civil war between different ethnic groups – may have a clearly destabilizing effect. Chaotic presidential elections, perceived by a large share of the population as illegitimate, pose the risk of undermining the preconditions for a successful security transition in 2014, and thereby also Afghanistan’s long-term development. If large parts of the population or entire ethnic groups feel excluded from political influence in the coming government in Kabul, this will pose a real risk for a military escalation, and, in a worst case scenario, military conflict.

It is broadly agreed that adjustments must be made to Afghanistan’s current electoral system in order to ensure that the coming presidential and parliamentary elections can be conducted in a credible fashion. Amendments to the electoral system take time, and preparations for the coming elections are therefore already under way. This is not least the case when it comes to building the Afghan capacity to plan and conduct the elections.

Another significant factor for the future stability of Afghanistan is the peace and reconciliation process with the Taliban and other insurgents. There is a growing recognition both in the Afghan population and within the international community that it will be difficult to achieve stability and security without some form of political agreement with the insurgents. The military efforts cannot stand alone and must be supplemented by political and diplomatic efforts that can underpin a peace and reconciliation process owned and led by the Afghans. This must be based on the principles that insurgents renounce the use of violence, sever all ties to international terrorist organisations, and that a potential political agreement does not violate the Afghan constitution. At this point it is difficult to make predictions about the prospects and a timeline for a potential overarching national peace agreement.

Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries – not least Pakistan – play a pivotal role in this context. The Pakistani government has publicly expressed support for an Afghan led peace and reconciliation process. However, militant groups continue to enjoy a safe haven in Pakistan. Iran, India, Russia and Saudi Arabia do, however, also play important parts in the efforts to achieve a long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan.

The Istanbul Conference in November 2011 and the ensuing conference in Kabul in June 2012 highlighted precisely the regional aspects. The Istanbul process is to a high degree aimed at building mutual confidence between countries in the region by strengthening their cooperation on common cross-border problems such as criminal networks and drug trafficking across borders. The hope is that increased confidence and greater mutual dependence will make the countries of the region realize that they have a common interest in a stable Afghanistan. Closer integration among the countries of the region will also mean increased economic possibilities for Afghanistan, which can contribute to the effort of lessening Afghanistan’s dependence on international assistance.
In the coming years – and in the longer term – the Danish engagement will consist of assistance to the civilian sphere and to the security sector, underpinned by political dialogue with our Afghan and international partners. This also means that already from the beginning of 2013, the Danish efforts must gradually be adapted to the reality after 2014.

With this starting-point, Denmark will enter into a Danish-Afghan strategic partnership in which the long-term Danish engagement is reaffirmed. The partnership agreement will encompass the main elements of the Danish engagement in the political, economic and security-related areas, as well as expectations to the reforms that the Afghan Government will commit to. The agreement will not encompass new Danish economic or military obligations.

With a continued active and adapted engagement in Afghanistan, Denmark will support the Afghan endeavour to secure peace, stability and development in Afghanistan in cooperation with our close allies. We do this because it benefits Afghanistan, the international community as well as Denmark. The effort to secure stability in Afghanistan is a national, regional and global responsibility – and Denmark will do its share. The continued Danish engagement contributes to the promotion of national and international security interests. The continued support for the Afghan security sector is necessary
in order to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a breeding ground for international terrorism.

The Danish engagement will be in keeping with Denmark’s development strategy, which gives high priority to stability and protection of fragile states in conflict zones. Looking to the future, the Danish effort will continue to be based on comprehensive use of civilian and military assets, which has been a fundamental principle for the Danish efforts within the framework of the Danish Afghanistan Strategy 2008-2012. The efforts will to a large extent ensure that the work towards peace, stability and development in Afghanistan is based on local anchoring and ownership. In addition, the efforts will need continuous adjustment in light of the on-going developments in Afghanistan and the new needs in both the civilian and military areas. The Danish efforts will build on the recommendations from the 2012 evaluations of the last ten years of Danish developmental engagement in Afghanistan.

The assistance to Afghanistan will combine measures to fight poverty and a rights-based approach as parts of the efforts to create better prospects for the Afghan population.

The Danish efforts in the coming years will start from three overarching strategic principles: consolidation, Afghan ownership and normalization. These principles will be looked into in the following.

The level of ambition for Denmark’s efforts must therefore be realistic and focus on minimum requirements regarding security and development as well as governance. In that sense consolidation is also about establishing realistic expectations for the situation in 2014. There are major challenges to be tackled, and setbacks can be expected both in relation to security and political progress.

Rather than launching a number of new programmes before 2015, the Danish focus will instead be on consolidating...
the progress already generated, and on transferring responsibility in a way that, in the best possible manner, enables the Afghans to maintain and expand a sustainable development process.

**AFGHAN OWNERSHIP**

Increased Afghan ownership and responsibility are necessary for developing the country. The Afghan authorities are well under way in taking over the tasks that have been carried out by international military forces and international development players in recent years. However, the ownership process will be decisive in the final stages of the transition process leading up to 2014. In order to support an enhanced Afghan responsibility and ownership, Denmark will increasingly channel the development assistance through Afghan systems, thereby placing the Afghan Government at the helm of development efforts and the prioritization of donated funds in accordance with the New Deal principles on support for fragile states.

Capacity building is crucial to the sustainability and the strengthening of the Afghan authorities’ legitimacy. Since 2001 the international assistance effort has been marked by the need of authorities and state institutions to be built and to function without a sufficient Afghan capacity. A consequence of this has been that the country’s authorities to various degrees have been run with help from national, regional and international consultants and NGOs.

In terms of security the on schedule transfer of security responsibility to the Afghans is a sign that the Afghan security forces are increasingly capable of handling the security challenges. There is, however, still a long way to go.

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2 The principles behind New Deal are detailed in chapter 5.1.
NORMALIZATION

As a more efficient Afghan state is taking shape, the cooperation between the Afghan authorities and the international communities must evolve in the direction of more traditional and long-term development cooperation. This normalization is necessary for the creation of a sustainable development process.

The Afghan state budget is to a great extent financed by the donor community – the yearly international development assistance today is equivalent in size to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). This is not sustainable. The main aim of normalization is therefore to support a sustainable development process within the Afghan economy. The current movement away from short-term development and stabilization projects in favour of more coherent programmes should be continued. To this end the principles of the fragile states’ own demands of themselves and the donors – as part of the so-called New Deal – offer a clear and helpful perspective.

The task for Afghan authorities will not be easy, and Afghanistan will not for the foreseeable future become a development partner country that is comparable with Denmark’s other partner countries. The situation and the security circumstances remain too challenging for this to happen. The cooperation with the Afghan Government will continue to be marked by the fact that the country is a fragile state. There will also in the coming years be a risk of corruption, failed initiatives and setbacks. The normalization therefore also entails a need to accept some risk.
The Afghan instructor staff at Camp Shorabak has reached a level which allows for the hand over of the training tasks to the Afghan army and withdrawal of the Danish trainers at the turn of the year 2012-2013.

Photo: Army Operational Command
3.3 IMPLEMENTATION

The strategic principles reviewed above will constitute the guidelines for the Danish efforts in 2013-2014. The implementation of the strategic principles will be continuously adapted to developments leading up to 2014. In general terms, this will involve the following adjustments:

Firstly, a reduction and restructuring of the military effort will take place. The military efforts will be gradually reduced and shift towards focusing predominantly on assistance and advisory efforts, and all Danish combat contributions will be withdrawn by the end of 2014 in accordance with the existing Helmand Plan and the Danish Government Platform. More specifically, this will involve a relative change in the balance between military and civilian efforts as the military presence is continuously reduced.

Secondly, a gradual shift in the geographic focus of the Danish efforts will take place. The geographic shift means that while the current military presence to a large degree is decentralized and focused in the individual districts of Helmand, the future Danish military effort will gradually gravitate around efforts to assist and advise at the central level in connection with the larger strategic bases and in the Kabul area. In tandem with this, the civilian presence in Helmand will likewise gradually be phased out. At this point an overwhelming part of Danish development assistance is already being delivered through the Afghan systems, which is also the case with a large part of the Danish assistance to Helmand. Until the end of 2014, a part of the development funds will, however, be earmarked for initiatives in the Helmand province in order to underpin the sustainability of the results already achieved.

Thirdly, flexibility will be a key concept. It will be crucial for the Danish military and civilian efforts during this period that they can be adapted to the many unknown factors, including the security situation, as well as to the need to coordinate the efforts with the Afghan authorities, close coalition partners and other central players.
During 2012 the Danish troop contingent underwent a significant restructuring away from a combat role in the direction of increased efforts in training and assistance as part of the implementation of the Helmand Plan 2011-2012. This restructuring – as well as a continuous overall reduction of the Danish military presence – will progress throughout 2013-2014. In accordance with the Helmand Plan 2011-2012, Danish combat units will be withdrawn by the end of 2014. The period of 2013-2014 will be characterized by continued support for the building of Afghan security forces.

The need for training and assistance is expected to change character during 2013-2014. In 2011 and 2012 the Danish training and advisory activities have primarily been focused on the lower echelons of the Afghan security forces, including, among other things, support for the building of basic training for personnel in the Afghan Army and the Afghan Police. One example of this is that it at the turn of the year 2012/2013 was possible to withdraw the Danish training contribution to the Afghan regional military training centre, to which Denmark has contributed since February 2012, because it was assessed by ISAF that the training centre on its own will be able to run the necessary basic training for Afghan Army personnel in the future. Towards the end of 2014, an increased need is anticipated for training, advice and assistance contributions within specialized areas and to the higher
leadership echelons of the Afghan security forces. By extension of this and beginning in the autumn of 2013, Denmark will contribute instructors to the Afghan National Army Officer Academy in Kabul, which will commence the training of officers for the Afghan Army at that time. It is foreseen that emphasis will be given to this type of contributions towards 2014. Towards the end of 2014, it will similarly be necessary to provide assistance through technically and operationally complicated contributions, including, among other things, contributions of military air capacity.

Many years of Danish military efforts are facing a drawdown. This entails a major logistical task requiring many resources in relation to continuously recovering or disposing of hardware, and dismantling the Danish parts of camps and installations in 2013 and 2014, including, among other things, vehicles, containers, tents and maintenance equipment. Disposal and recovery will commence as soon as possible with a view to streamlining the recovery process and minimizing costs. The process of recovery and dismantling should be expected to continue into the period after 2014.

The Danish military contribution will number some 650 personnel from the beginning of 2013 and is anticipated to go through gradual reductions towards the end of 2014 concurrently with the transfer of responsibility to the Afghans, requirements on the ground and the reduction of the ISAF effort.

At the beginning of 2013, the military contribution will include combat, training and support contributions. No later than the end of 2014, the troop contingent is anticipated to undergo a reorganization to encompass only training and support contributions. The geographic presence of the Danish military will be reduced in the Helmand province during 2013-2014. In parallel, the Danish troop contingents will also become increasingly concentrated in the large strategic bases and in the Kabul area, where support contributions and contributions aimed at capacity building of higher military echelons and capacities are situated, e.g. the Afghan National Army Officers Academy in Kabul.
The plan for the Danish military efforts in 2013-2014 has been developed in close coordination with the United Kingdom and NATO/ISAF, among others. The implementation of the plan will take place in coordination with Denmark’s close partners in ISAF and in light of developments in the actual conditions on the ground. The years 2013-2014 form the concluding stages of the transition phase, and therefore many unknown factors will come into play, among other things in connection with the ending of the ISAF mission and the establishment of a new NATO-led mission after 2014. Particularly in light of this, a need may arise to make adjustments to the implementation of the plan.

**Combat contributions** will at the beginning of 2013 encompass the remaining infantry company – in an unchanged role as quick reaction force supporting the Afghan and international security forces – and tanks with an organic combat support structure. The Danish combat units will remain under British command as part of Task Force Helmand. As per agreement with the UK and in parallel with the transfer of responsibility to the Afghan security forces in the Nahr-e-Saraj district, the infantry company and its combat support structure is anticipated to be withdrawn no later than early 2014. The tanks and their support structure will be withdrawn no later than by mid-2014.

**Training contributions** will at the beginning of 2013 include a special operations troop contribution in Lashkar Gah in support of training and building of an Afghan police special force unit in the Helmand province (the Helmand Provincial Response Company), and two police operational mentoring and liaison teams attached to the police in Gereshk. Furthermore, during 2013 a contingent of instructors and planners will, as mentioned, be deployed to the Afghan National Army Officers Academy in Kabul. Provided that an acceptable
framework can be identified, a smaller contingent of personnel from the Danish Home Guard is expected to be deployed during 2013 in support of the US National Guard for the development of the agricultural sector in Helmand.

Support contributions will at the beginning of 2013 include a mobile air control centre in northern Afghanistan, a C-130 transport aircraft based in Kandahar as well as periodic contributions of doctors and nurses to the field hospital in Camp Bastion. In addition to this, a contingent of personnel to support the operation of the important strategic airports in Kandahar and Kabul will be deployed beginning from the first half of 2013. NATO has – as part of a number of priority elements – mentioned the need for helicopters and aircraft, including transport and combat aircraft. As mentioned, Denmark currently contributes a C-130 transport aircraft scheduled for withdrawal by the end of March 2013. It is the intention that the offer in the Helmand Plan 2011-2012 to contribute with transport helicopters will be effectuated beginning from mid-2014 subject to requirement, the specific tasks and the geographic location. A final decision on deployment of transport helicopters will be made during 2013. The question of and decision on deployment of further Danish contributions in the form of combat aircraft will be discussed among the parties to this agreement in mid-2013. In this regard, it should be noted that Parliamentary Decision B-24 does not foresee the deployment of combat aircraft, thus a new parliamentary decision would be required should the occasion arise.

Apart from the aforementioned contributions, personnel for headquarters, a national support element, military police and other support functions will be included in the overall military contribution. Furthermore, specialized logistics teams will be continuously deployed throughout 2013 and 2014 in order to manage the disposal and recovery of hardware etc. in relation to the reduction of the total contribution.

The specific size of the individual contributions and the detailed composition of the troop contingent will be continuously adapted to the actual needs on the ground. As a general rule, the Danish contributions will continue to rotate every six months – in February and August. Significant changes to the Danish military contribution during 2013-2014 are therefore as far as possible expected to take place in relation to these rotations.

At the beginning of 2013, the troop numbers of the total Danish contribution will be approximately 650 personnel. Provided that developments progress as described above, the troop numbers will be reduced as, among other things, the mobile air control centre, transport aircraft, police operational mentoring and liaison teams and the remaining infantry company are withdrawn. From early 2014, the total Danish contribution is expected to number some 250 personnel; from mid-2014 the troop contingent will be further reduced to about 200 personnel (including the transport helicopter contribution) as the Danish tanks are withdrawn, and by the beginning of 2015 the troop contingent is expected to number approximately 150 personnel including a transport helicopter contribution. The specialized logistics teams are not included in the troop numbers mentioned above.
The Danish Force Contribution to Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2013-2014

**Period 1**
- **Combat and enablers**
  - Infantry Company
  - Tanks
- **Training**
  - 2x Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
  - Special Operations Forces in Military Assistance Role
- **Enablers**
  - Transport aircraft (C130J)
  - Mobile Air Control Centre
  - Airport operation and service
- **Troop numbers including helicopters:**
  - Approx. 650 persons

**Period 2**
- **Combat and enablers**
  - Infantry Company
  - Tanks
- **Training**
  - 1x Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
  - Special Operations Forces in Military Assistance Role
- **Enablers**
  - Transport aircraft (C130J)
  - Mobile Air Control Centre
  - Airport operation and service
- **Troop numbers including helicopters:**
  - Approx. 580 persons

**Period 3**
- **Training and enablers**
  - Instructors to ANA Officers Academy in Kabul
- **Enablers**
  - Transport helicopters
- **Troop numbers including helicopters:**
  - Approx. 250 persons (Approx. 200 persons)

**Period 4**
- **Training and enablers**
  - Instructors to ANA Officers Academy in Kabul
- **Enablers**
  - Transport helicopters
- **Troop numbers including helicopters:**
  - Approx. 80 persons (Approx. 150 persons)

**Timeline:**
- 1 January 2013
- 1 January 2014
- 1 January 2015
IN 2013 AND 2014 DENMARK WILL

- Continue the contribution of an infantry company, tanks and accompanying combat support units to Task Force Helmand. The infantry company is expected to be withdrawn no later than February 2014, while the tanks are anticipated to be withdrawn no later than mid-2014.

- Continue the contribution of two police operational mentoring and liaison teams, consisting of two civilian police servicemen, military police and a military escort in support of the training of police in the central part of the Helmand province. The plan is to withdraw the police operational mentoring and liaison teams successively and according with developments until the beginning of 2014.

- Continue to contribute special operations forces in a training role to support the training of Afghan police special forces in the central part of the Helmand province. The training assignment in relation to the Afghan police special forces is expected to be concluded in early 2014; however a potential extension with a reduced contribution may be possible.

- Continue the periodic contribution of a team of doctors and nurses to the field hospital in Camp Bastion.

- Extend the deployment of a C-130 transport aircraft for the first three months of 2013, upon which the contribution will be withdrawn.

- Extend the deployment of the mobile air control centre in northern Afghanistan by three months up to and including May 2013.

- Deploy a contingent of personnel to support the operation of the strategic airports in Kandahar and Kabul beginning in the first half of 2013.

- Deploy up to 8 personnel from the Danish Home Guard towards the end of 2013 in support of the US National Guard’s development of the agricultural sector in Helmand, provided that an acceptable framework can be identified.

- Deploy a contingent of up to 15 instructors and planners to the Afghan National Army Officers Academy in Kabul beginning in 2013.

- Effectuate the offer from the Helmand Plan 2011-2012 about deployment of a transport helicopter contribution beginning from mid-2014, this being subject to demand, specific tasks and geographic location. A final decision on deployment will be made during 2013.
4.2 THE POLICE EFFORT

In 2013-2014 Denmark will continue to contribute to the development of the Afghan police (ANP) – both in the form of deployed police servicemen and through financial support. As the police effort in Helmand is stepped down, the support for the EUPOL will equally increase, so that the aim will be for Denmark to contribute up to 14 police servicemen to the mission. In connection with the planning of the future efforts, EUPOL has chosen to concentrate its work in two main areas: (1) A police Staff College, which receives financial support from countries both within and outside the EU, and (2) Civilian Policing, which is primarily carried out through the Afghan Uniform Police (AU(C)P) Project.

Within the framework of the police operational mentoring and liaison teams in Gereshk, the character of the police efforts will change as a natural step in the transition process, and there will be a gradual reduction in the number of mentoring teams. The reduction, which is based on a professional police assessment of the possibilities of consolidating achieved results and securing the best possible starting point for future Afghan progress, is expected to be implemented by withdrawing the first police operational mentoring and liaison team in early 2013 and an additional team in mid-2013. The third and final police operational mentoring team will be withdrawn in early 2014.

The police training centre in Lashkar Gah in Helmand is tasked with implementing and facilitating teaching of Afghan police servicemen in civilian policing skills. As the expectation is for the Afghan instructors themselves to be able to take charge of the teaching in the future, the Danish police servicemen from the training centre are expected to be withdrawn no later than mid-2013 in coordination with the British plans.

The deployment of a Danish police serviceman as advisor to the special operations force contribution Task Force 7 (TF 7) is expected to continue until the conclusion of that assignment in 2014.
4.3 ASSISTANCE FOR THE BUILDING OF AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

Apart from training and supporting the Afghan Security Forces (ANSF), it is also absolutely essential to ensure financing for their operation. This concerns, among other things, salaries for both the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA). The Afghans are not yet able to finance these expenses themselves. Both towards and after 2014 there will be a need for international assistance.

The future Danish contribution to the financing of the ANSF follows the prior large Danish efforts in the area of security, which has included training, mentoring and financial assistance for the Afghan military and police. Similarly, the Danish contribution to the financing of the ANSF will continue to be an indispensable complement to the Danish training and support efforts in the coming years. However, there can be no doubt that continued financing is absolutely necessary in order to ensure an Afghan security force, which is capable of handling the security challenges that must be expected in the coming years.

In accordance with the decision on Danish assistance to the ANSF in 2015—2017 with DKK 100 million annually, Danish assistance will be increased incrementally during 2013 and 2014.

The main part of the assistance will go to the Afghan police. The specific composition of the total Danish contribution to the ANSF is presented in table 1.

Table 1: Expected disbursements to the ANSF 2013-2017 (millions DKK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of funding</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of the Danish Ministry of Defence to the ANA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution from Danish development assistance to the ANP</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Danish contribution to the ANSF</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The core task in Afghanistan in the coming years will be to assist the Afghans in becoming as prepared as possible for the time after 2014, when the Afghan state will be in charge of far greater tasks than previously. The security responsibility is one thing. In addition to this, governance and the delivery of basic services will have to take place with a considerably smaller international presence, both nationally and locally. In order to ensure that Danish support for Afghanistan is utilized on development activities, and to avoid that a too large part of the funds is spent on security expenses, we will primarily channel Danish funds through Afghan authorities, multilateral trust funds and international organisations.

5.1 CROSSCUTTING ASPECTS OF THE CIVILIAN EFFORTS

Denmark will – in accordance with the principle of consolidation – focus on strengthening the links between the capitol level and the local level in the years leading up to 2014. We must contribute to the structures of authorities being settled once Denmark and other donors begin to step down their presence at the provincial level, especially in terms of channelling financial, as well as administrative resources from Kabul. It is crucial that the population in Afghanistan’s provinces and districts witness and experience that the Afghan Government is delivering concrete improvements in the form of schools, health clinics, better law enforcement and jobs.
All experience shows that the only way to a sustainable development process is through local ownership and responsibility for one’s own progress combined with the political will to maintain a focus on poverty reduction and development. Denmark will therefore work towards an increased Afghan ownership, thereby placing the Afghan Government at the head of the table to an even greater degree when it comes to prioritizing the development assistance. It is crucial that the Afghans themselves are in charge of finding solutions to the many tasks, even if this in the first instance can result in less efficient solutions than the ones that can be implemented through international assistance.

Parallel financing must cease, and the Afghan Government must prioritize the utilization of donated funds. First of all, international assistance, which is channelled through the Afghan systems, must be increased. This approach is in line with the principles that Denmark and the rest of the international donor community have committed to in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. Hereby we place the Afghans in the lead when it comes to prioritization, and we support the Afghans’ own national development strategy. Denmark already complies with the aim of delivering more than 50 per cent of the assistance on-budget – that is to say, channelled through the Afghan national budget – and of 80 per cent being aligned with Afghan priorities. This number should grow in the coming years parallel to the increase in the Danish assistance to Afghanistan.

The Afghan Government must in turn secure broad democratic inclusion in the planning and prioritizing of development funds, and not least demonstrate accountability and transparency in the utilization of the donated funds. These mutual obligations are a part of the “contract”, which was agreed upon by the international community and the Afghan Government at the Tokyo Conference. Denmark will follow up on this contract by allowing a larger part of the Danish assistance to Afghanistan to rest on incentives, so that the size and character

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**WHAT IS NEW DEAL?**

New Deal is a new international approach envisaged to make development initiatives in fragile states more effective. The approach aims to ensure that the work towards peace, stability and development in fragile states and conflict zones builds on local anchoring and ownership, especially within the five following areas: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic bases, and revenue and services. Afghanistan is one out of seven pilot countries of the New Deal, and Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom constitute Afghanistan’s partner countries. As a partner country Denmark has committed together with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to active and continuous support for the Afghan implementation of the New Deal approach.
of the Danish development assistance will depend on concrete progress.

As more funds will be channelled through the Afghan systems in the future, there may – as a result – be setbacks in some areas. Denmark will therefore work to ensure that the management of activities supported by Denmark prevents – as far as possible – the misuse of development funds, and support supervision mechanisms and institutions, which can combat potential corruption and fraud. Denmark will consistently follow up on all cases of suspected misuse of Danish development funds. Thus, Denmark will be ready to translate words into action and withhold assistance, should Danish funds not be used as intended or not managed efficiently.

In line with the principle of normalization, Denmark will focus on fewer and larger programmes. By focusing assistance on fewer activities, Denmark gains more leverage in the dialogue with partners and other donors. We will exercise our influence and enter into close dialogue with our partners. Denmark will – where reasonable – work towards a higher degree of common programming with other donors, mainly with like-minded donors, for instance the Nordic countries and countries of the EU.

Through the establishment of civilian Afghan capacity and the large share of funds being channelled through the national budget, the Danish efforts have
already made much progress in terms of operating through more ordinary designs of assistance. From 2013, Denmark will go even further by transitioning its efforts to multiannual programmes. Predictable assistance will enable our Afghan partners to make more long-term planning and thereby ensure more effective activities.

One part of the normalization process is also to phase out the decentralized engagement of Denmark in Helmand as our development assistance is increasingly managed from Kabul. The so-called district stabilization teams of the PRT will therefore gradually be closed down, as the focus turns increasingly to the national and provincial levels. This means that assistance will be provided from and via the provincial level in Lashkar Gah instead of at the district level, and after 2014 almost exclusively through the national authorities. Until the end of 2014, earmarked contributions to Helmand will be made in order to secure the sustainability of the results achieved in Helmand.

The Danish civilian efforts in Afghanistan, including Helmand, will concentrate on the following specified focus areas, which mutually underpin the development towards a more sustainable Afghan society, namely (1) economic growth and employment with a focus on agriculture, (2) education, and (3) good governance.

In addition to this, Denmark will provide assistance to (4) the peace and reconciliation process and regional confidence building efforts, and (5) reintegration of returned refugees and internally displaced persons, as well providing emergency humanitarian assistance as needed, including through Danish organisations. These focus areas are detailed in the following paragraphs.

In the Danish engagement, initiatives that promote good governance will continue to be the largest focus area, since efficient public authorities that are accountable to their citizens are crucial to whether or not the common Afghan will continue to support the Afghan state.

A large part of the Danish assistance will also be dedicated to financing the building of the Afghan security forces so that they are able to handle security matters after the international combat contributions have been phased out. The programmes in the areas of education and economic growth and employment are crucial to

WHAT IS A PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT)?

The British-led PRT in Helmand is a jointly integrated military-civilian organisation with headquarters in the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah, which has approximately 170 military staff, police officers, diplomats, advisors and experts and approximately 5-10 local staff.

Denmark, which occupies one of the positions of deputy chief in the PRT has 8 staff of diplomats, advisors, police and military staff respectively posted to the PRT. PRT Helmand’s overall tasks are to coordinate the international stabilization effort and assist the Afghan Government in expanding its exercise of authority and legitimacy in the Helmand province. The PRT is not an alternative to Afghan authorities, but part of the effort to increase the capacity of the Afghan provincial and district authorities. The aim is to create a local administration that will contribute to improving the security situation and ensure that the Afghans can manage governance, economic development and the delivery of services.
The expected annual disbursements of Danish development aid to Afghanistan from 2013-2017 in million DKK. The average yearly disbursement is 530 million DKK.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth and job creation for the youth</td>
<td>![Graph: 78]</td>
<td>![Graph: 80]</td>
<td>![Graph: 90]</td>
<td>![Graph: 90]</td>
<td>![Graph: 110]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>![Graph: 115]</td>
<td>![Graph: 115]</td>
<td>![Graph: 100]</td>
<td>![Graph: 100]</td>
<td>![Graph: 100]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance</td>
<td>![Graph: 126]</td>
<td>![Graph: 118]</td>
<td>![Graph: 108]</td>
<td>![Graph: 108]</td>
<td>![Graph: 200]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian efforts and civil society support *</td>
<td>![Graph: 66]</td>
<td>![Graph: 53]</td>
<td>![Graph: 53]</td>
<td>![Graph: 53]</td>
<td>![Graph: 53]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned refugees</td>
<td>![Graph: 75]</td>
<td>![Graph: 75]</td>
<td>![Graph: 75]</td>
<td>![Graph: 75]</td>
<td>![Graph: 75]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building of ANSF **</td>
<td>![Graph: 20]</td>
<td>![Graph: 35]</td>
<td>![Graph: 80]</td>
<td>![Graph: 80]</td>
<td>![Graph: 80]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other efforts</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total per year</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The amount is estimated. Actual amounts will depend on the country's humanitarian situation and development
** Not including the contribution from the Ministry of Defence to capacity building of the ANSF
the long-term development of Afghanistan, so that poverty can be reduced, and for the country over time to reduce its dependence on international assistance. Furthermore, Denmark will continue to make a considerable contribution to humanitarian efforts and to initiatives to resettle and further the employment of returned refugees and internally displaced persons. Finally, a more limited assistance to initiatives that further regional confidence building work will be provided.

5.2 Economic Growth and Employment

Stable economic growth is crucial to Afghanistan’s development, if the Afghan Government is to be able to offer the Afghans access to, for instance, education and health services. A sustainable economic growth and better employment possibilities will at the same time contribute to reducing poverty in Afghanistan.

The vast majority of Afghanistan’s youth has very limited economic possibilities, while at the same time it represents a large resource. Coincidentally, it is assessed that large segments among the insurgents are motivated by a lack of alternative sources of income rather than by ideology.

The many refugees and internally displaced persons of Afghanistan also constitute an important resource. Apart from a pronounced need for improved possibilities in the country’s many refugee camps, refugees with an education and vocational experience from their country of residence will be able to contribute to the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan.

In 2013-2014 Denmark Will:

- Keep the Afghan Government to its obligations from the Tokyo Conference. These include obligations in the area of human rights and women’s rights
- Work towards Afghan ownership and responsibility in relation to prioritization of the development assistance
- Focus its assistance further and primarily channel funds through Afghan authorities, multilateral trust funds and international organisations
- Continue to normalize the assistance and focus on the national level
- Work towards closer collaboration between national and subnational Afghan authorities
- Work towards greater predictability in the assistance delivery, in order to, among other things, give the Afghan authorities better possibilities for planning
- Assist the work of Afghan anti-corruption organisations and authorities to fight corruption and continue to apply a zero tolerance approach to any form of misuse of Danish development funds
If Afghanistan’s potential is to be utilised, the private sector must be developed and strengthened. This relates especially to the small and medium-sized enterprises and to agriculture. Weak legislation, bureaucracy, bad infrastructure, limited access to markets, credit, services and organisation, as well as widespread corruption, impede progress.

For this reason, Denmark will in 2014 launch a new programme, which shall promote growth and job creation in Afghanistan. The programme will focus particularly on the agriculture and food sector, where the majority of all Afghans already work and gain their income. The sector harbours the largest potential for growth and job creation. In the short term, focus will be on the Afghan home market in order to lessen the country’s need to import basic foods, and in order to improve food security. Starting from the value chain of each individual agricultural produce “from farm to fork”, work is undertaken to identify the areas that can generate the most value and thereby the greatest income, as well as barriers for the private sector and in particular for the development of agriculture.

The programme will also support tradespecific education and training aimed at giving especially young people the necessary qualifications that are sought after in the agriculture and food sector.

In the future, Denmark will continue to maintain a special focus on the inclusion and education of more women in the area of agriculture. The agricultural sector presents an area where many women in Afghanistan are traditionally involved.

In addition to this, Denmark will maintain its support for initiatives that have a dual aim of creating stability and reducing conflict by offering young Afghan men a real alternative to insurgency and a life in crime, as well as by offering insurgents education and job possibilities in turn for them laying down their arms.

Improved legal income possibilities within the agriculture and food sector shall additionally create an alternative to income from the production and trade of opium in southern Afghanistan, where close to 90 per cent of the world’s opium production takes place. The drug econom and the violence and corruption that come with it will constitute a very difficult challenge for Afghanistan in the years ahead.
Considerable results have been achieved in the education sector. In 2001 only about 1 million children attended school, among them hardly any girls. Today more than 8 million children attend school; among them just under 40 per cent are girls. The capacity of the Ministry of Education has been significantly improved, and the Ministry is now far more capable of evaluating needs within the sector. Large challenges do, however, remain: More than 4 million school-aged children do not receive tuition. Access to education is largely dependent on the security situation and on the infrastructure, and thereby unequally distributed across the country. Many more schools are needed to ensure sufficient access for all school-aged children. More teachers must be trained, and the teachers already trained should have possibilities of improving their qualifications.

Denmark will continue its substantial engagement in the area of education, and will in light of previous experience and results continue to focus on assisting a sustainable and Afghan run education sector. The on-going reform-focused effort has already contributed to a relatively efficient and well-functioning system, but an extended effort will be required before the sector can stand on its own two feet. The international community should move away from parallel structures, and ensure that the Afghan systems not only gain increased capacity, but are also utilized. For this reason, Denmark will to an even higher degree support Afghanistan’s own national education strategy directly, and not earmark the assistance for specific activities or initiatives. As a leading donor in the education sector, Denmark actively encourages other donors to move in the same direction. This approach to assisting the education sector will promote sustainability and Afghan ownership.

**IN 2013-2014 DENMARK WILL:**

- Contribute to the development leading towards a more modern agriculture and food sector
- Work towards better access to loans and local food markets
- Assist the development of a more qualified work force within the area of agriculture and food industry, focusing particularly on young people
- Support the development of areas within agriculture and the food industry with a high employment rate for women
- Work towards returned refugees and internally displaced being more often taken into consideration in the broader effort for growth and employment

**5.3 EDUCATION**
Through a dialogue with the Ministry of Education and the Afghan Government, Denmark will place emphasis on the provision of education for everyone in line with a more rights-based approach. The dialogue with the Ministry of Education will also underscore the importance of improving the quality of tuition, ensuring sustainability throughout the system, which includes decentralization and a focus on capacity building at the provincial and district levels, an enhanced relation between the education and job sectors, as well as fighting corruption. The dialogue between Denmark and the Ministry of Education will to a higher degree take off from qualitative and not simply quantitative results of education efforts.

Also after the Danish civilian presence in Helmand has been phased out, focus will remain on the national education effort in the provinces. Generally speaking, efforts will revolve around consolidating the achieved results through focusing, among other things, on improving the quality and depth of the education system. In 2013-2014, Denmark will still be financing certain activities in Helmand focused on access to schools in remote areas that are difficult to reach for the formal education sector due to the security situation.

**5.4 GOOD GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY**

There is still a long way to go before the Afghan Government can be said to live up to its obligations in the area of human rights, before legitimate systems have been established, and before a more efficient public sector, which can do a better job of implementing the rule of law and delivering basic services to the Afghan people, has been formed. These circumstances undermine the confidence of the population in the state and give insurgents a platform for recruiting new members and presenting an alternative to the Afghan Government. Continued progress in governance and the building of a legitimate Afghan state is therefore critical in order to sustain a successful and irreversible transition process, and not least to form the basis for a sustainable development process in the longer term. Additionally, through contributions to independent anti-corruption institutions, Denmark will assist Afghan organisations that can keep the Afghan Government to its commitments.
Denmark will continue to support the formation of a more efficient public administration with the World Bank as the primary partner. The Danish effort will mainly revolve around support for reform initiatives and capacity building in the ministries. An important priority in the work of bringing about reform is to ensure a more efficient system for the channelling of funds to the local level as well as to promote the inclusion of the population in the prioritization of development projects.

Denmark will continue to provide assistance for democratic elections. Firstly, Denmark will support the long-term formation of a robust election system, where the Afghans gain the ability to plan and hold democratic elections on their own. Among other things, Denmark will through the UN support capacity building of Afghan election institutions as well as continue to support civil society to push for electoral system reform. Secondly, Denmark will assist the preparations for the execution of the presidential elections in the spring of 2014. Finally, Denmark will – in cooperation with civil society, among others – support election monitoring missions.

Denmark will exercise its political influence to ensure that human rights and especially the rights of women and children are accommodated. Denmark will make it clear that progress in this area is a precondition for the long-term Danish assistance to Afghanistan. Denmark will additionally continue its support for civil society projects aimed at improving conditions for women, and ensuring better access to legal assistance for women and women’s crisis centres. Denmark will also actively pursue the effort to include women in the peace and reconciliation process (see chapter 5.5). Denmark will furthermore look at whether women’s conditions can be further promoted in other areas, possibly in collaboration with like-minded partners.

Denmark will continue to take part in the effort to strengthen Afghan human rights organisations and their work to increase

Ballot papers in connection with the elections for Parliament in 2010. Photo: ISAF Media
the respect for – and monitor violations of – human rights, among other things through support for a network of civil society organisations, the Civil Society Human Rights Organisation and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. At the same time, the Danish support aims at reinforcing the role of civil society in the effort to keep the Afghan Government to its commitments and in terms of spokesmanship in favour of the continued propagation of rights.

Denmark will through the World Bank contribute to development and reform of the justice sector. Denmark will also continue to support civil society organisations that work within the justice sector. In Helmand, Denmark will continue the effort of training and mentoring judges, defence attorneys and the police until 2014, hereby also generating greater confidence in the legitimacy of the system among the population in Helmand.

Denmark will – primarily through the established multiple-donor civil society fund – continue to provide support for the civil society, so that civil society organisations can act as watchdogs and keep the Afghan Government to its commitments in terms of human rights, democratization initiatives, counter-corruption efforts, securing press freedom and the freedom of speech, and so on. The fund gives special priority to the projects aimed at benefitting – or run by – young people.

Cooperation between Danish NGOs and the Afghans is an important element in the relationship between Denmark and Afghanistan. The Danish organisations that operate in Afghanistan should continue to focus their efforts on capacity building of Afghan authorities and civil society organisations, in addition to their activities aimed at the Afghans’ living conditions.

**IN 2013-2014 DENMARK WILL:**

- Contribute to the formation of a more efficient public administration, focusing efforts on financial management
- Support the work of Afghan players to curb corruption and maintain a zero-tolerance approach towards any form of misuse of Danish assistance funds
- Denmark will support democratization processes, thereby creating better conditions for holding elections that are more free and fair
- Continue to keep the Afghan Government to its human rights commitments
- Continue to give high priority to the rights of women and children
- Support development and reforms of the justice sector, also in Helmand
- Continue to support the establishment of Afghan civil society organisations
5.5 THE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS

It is important that the peace and reconciliation process is Afghan led and owned. The approach of Denmark is therefore to support this process through indirect means. Thus, the reconciliation process will be supported through the UN with technical and logistical assistance to the High Peace Council, which was established in 2010 and holds the overall responsibility for driving the peace process forward.

Human rights organisations and women's organisations have expressed particular concern that women's rights may be sacrificed in the strive to achieve a political agreement with the Taliban during the peace and reconciliation process. Denmark will work politically to ensure that human rights, and the rights of women in particular, are protected in a potential political agreement. Aimed at this, Denmark has, among other things, initiated activities to advance the role of women in the Afghan peace and reconciliation process. Denmark will also continue to provide support for the Afghan-led reintegration process, which is a part of the efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict. The reintegration programme is aimed at creating a framework for provinces and districts to receive and reintegrate former insurgents that have chosen to lay down their arms.

In recent years the focus on regional aspects of the peace and reconciliation process, and with it a sustainable political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan, has increased. Denmark will, as far as possible, support the regional players throughout this development. The first step has been taken with the initiation of the three-year Afghanistan and Pakistan Programme in 2012.

Denmark supports the regional aspects of the Afghan peace and reconciliation process, among other things through the UN initiative to promote cooperation on border issues between Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries. Especially the control of border crossings is a sizeable challenge to stability in Afghanistan, since large quantities of narcotics are transported out of Afghanistan, and weapons and explosives are smuggled in via these border crossings.

Denmark will also provide political support for the Istanbul process, which was initiated with the Istanbul Conference on 2 November 2011. The purpose of the process is to promote the regional cooperation and enhance the political dialogue concerning regional challenges such as terrorism, extremism and narcotics. The political dialogue is based on the launch of a number of specific confidence building arrangements aimed at promoting regional cooperation. The key players of the region are themselves in charge of leading and running the process. Like other donor countries, Denmark will support the implementation of these arrangements, with special focus on the fight against narcotics and disaster management.

3 The programme is financed by the Peace and Stabilization Fund which comprises both development assistance funds and stabilization funds.
IN 2013 AND 2014 DENMARK WILL:

- Support the Afghan peace and reconciliation process through the work of the High Peace Council
- Strengthen the focus on women’s involvement in the peace process
- Continue to support the reintegration of former insurgents, who choose to lay down their arms
- Support the regional dialogue and the political and economic cooperation, and the role of the UN in promoting it
**5.6 RETURNED REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE EFFORTS**

Danish humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan will be based on a combination of long-term efforts to **support the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons** in Afghanistan, and **emergency assistance** to respond to the consequences of natural disasters and conflict.

After three decades of war, the situation of the Afghan refugees is among the largest and most prolonged refugee situations in the world. With an estimated 5.7 million returned refugees and a further 3 million Afghan refugees in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, the flow of refugees and internally displaced persons is expected to continue as security conditions and economic opportunities improve in Afghanistan. The Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons are the most exposed and vulnerable population group.

Denmark will contribute to sustainable solutions for returned and internally displaced persons, and work to increase the Afghan Government’s focus on the vast and special needs among people in this group. In the coming years the focus will also increase on refugees in urban areas, where a large number of returned refugees and internally displaced persons are situated.

Denmark will continue to contribute to the prevention and alleviation of **acute humanitarian** crises. Depending on the nature and scope of the crises the choice of partners in these efforts will typically include existing collaboration partners, among them UN organisations.

---

**IN 2013-2014 DENMARK WILL:**

- Contribute to the sustainable reintegration of returned refugees and internally displaced persons, including through support to societies that host them
- Focus on the refugee situation in urban areas
- Continue to contribute to the prevention and alleviation of humanitarian crises
Financing for Denmark’s engagement in Afghanistan is provided within the financial frameworks of the respective ministries. This will be the case both for 2013-2014 and for initiatives and projects after 2013-2014.

THE EFFORTS IN DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNANCE AND BUILDING OF THE AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES
In order to finance the civilian efforts that can be reported as development assistance in accordance with current OECD/DAC criteria, DKK 2,650 million have been set aside in disbursements to Afghanistan for the period of 2013-2017 on the proposed Danish national budget for 2013, which brings the annual disbursement level to an average of DKK 530 million.

The distribution of the funds for civilian efforts is illustrated in table 2 regarding the expected disbursements for the period 2013-2017.

THE MILITARY EFFORT
Concurrently with the gradual withdrawal during 2013-2014, funds from the Afghanistan efforts will be freed. However, equivalent expenses are expected in relation to the withdrawal of personnel, equipment and vehicles from Afghanistan. The basis for the added costs foreseen in the budget (see table 3) is the development of the troop contingent described in paragraph 4.1. The effort is financed within the reduced budget of the Danish Armed Forces.
Table 2: Expected disbursements in million DKK for the period of 2013-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus area</th>
<th>Effort</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
<td>ANSF financing¹</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional confidence building cooperation²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td>Good governance</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social development</strong></td>
<td>Economic growth and employment for young people</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other³</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returned refugees</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian efforts and support for civil society⁴</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Includes contributions from the Danish Ministry of Defence (not assistance funds). The disposition of ANSF financing between development assistance and the funds from the Danish Ministry of Defence is shown in table 1 on page 19.

2 Disbursements in 2012 of DKK 24 million cover expenses until 2014.

3 The amount reflects other projects and programmes that exist within the framework of the Danish engagement in Afghanistan.

4 The amount is an estimate. The actual size will depend on the situation and developments in the country.

THE POLICE EFFORT

In connection with the posting of Danish police servicemen to Afghanistan it is expected that expenses can be covered within a budgetary framework on the proposed Danish National Budget for 2013 dedicated to covering international postings of the Danish police. The anticipated expense for the posting of police servicemen will amount to DKK 10 million in 2013 and DKK 6 million in 2014.
Table 3: Added costs related to the effort in Afghanistan in 2013-2014
in million DKK (2012 price levels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>the total amount in 2013 og 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Danish military</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>1,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal of equipment and</td>
<td></td>
<td>350</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vehicles&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (incl. withdrawals)</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>2,062</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The added costs express the totalled costs related to the mission not counting the costs of planned activities in the domestic structure, which the Danish Armed Forces under any circumstances would have incurred. From an overall perspective changes to the composition and number of deployed personnel may alter the added costs. It should also be noted that the costs related to the potential deployment of a helicopter contribution are subject to some uncertainty. In spite of British experience in operating helicopters in Afghanistan, the intensity, operational environment and specific tasks in the period from mid 2014 and onwards cannot be predicted within certainty. All costs related to the potential deployment of a helicopter contribution will be financed within the reduced budget of the Danish Armed Forces.

2 This is an estimate, which is based on a number of factors, including, among other things, an estimate of the price trends for strategic transport and customs duties. If non-reparable and defective equipment and vehicles have to be withdrawn instead of disposed of in the area of operations, an estimated extraordinary one-time expense of app. DKK 100 million will be incurred. In this case the total added costs of the withdrawal of equipment and vehicles will be approximately DKK 450 million, which will be financed within the reduced budget of the Danish Armed Forces, for instance through adjustments to operating costs, freeing of funds from other international operations etc.
The end of 2014 will mark a central milestone for the development of Afghanistan and involve a shift in the role and efforts of the international community in the country. Afghanistan will continue to be a fragile state that will remain very dependent on international assistance during the decade after 2014.

By the end of 2014, Afghanistan must be self-reliant to a much higher degree when it comes to the overall exercise of authority, maintenance of security in the country, as well as the provision of services such as health care and education to the population. The Afghan security forces will have assumed the full responsibility for security in the country, but will continue to require support in capacity building, and is expected to also need limited assistance in a number of specific areas. The Afghan authorities will also be in charge of the activities previously contributed to by, among others, the PRTs in the provinces.

By the end of 2014, it is expected that the Afghan authorities will be able to provide basic services in health care and education to its population in the densely populated areas of the country. However, there will be a continued need for a significant strengthening of the Afghan authorities in a large number of areas in order to ensure that the Government will be able to fully live up to its constitutional obligations to protect and promote human rights.

In the more sparsely populated areas of the country, the Afghan authorities will
face particular challenges, as the foothold of the authorities will be more limited in these areas. It is to be expected that the Afghan security forces will not be able to maintain security in these areas to the same extent as ISAF, just as the Afghan police and legal system are expected to have difficulties in ensuring effective law enforcement. One consequence of this is likely to be that women’s rights and other improvements experienced by women in recent years will be particularly challenged, and setbacks are likely to occur in these sparsely populated areas.

The circumstances surrounding the Afghan presidential elections in April 2014 will have great significance for the Afghans’ confidence in their political system, and thereby for the further stabilization of the country after 2014. The course of the political transition will also be vital to the will of the international community to continue the provision of international political, security and developmental assistance.

The current Afghan peace and reconciliation process is also expected to play a crucial role for the development process in the country after 2014. Certain representatives of the Taleban have indicated a wish to engage in peace negotiations. In addition to this, there is need of involvement and support of the many different players on the Afghan domestic scene in order for a political agreement to gain broad support.

Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries, including Pakistan, India and Iran, also play pivotal roles in terms of the achievement of a sustainable political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. The leadership of the Taleban as well as other insurgent groups use Pakistan as a base, which is why active Pakistani support for peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taleban will be essential. Despite the chronically difficult relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there is a common understanding that a certain degree of cooperation is necessary. There are also emerging signals of a possible shift in the Pakistani approach to Afghanistan in terms of bringing the Taleban to negotiations on peace with the Afghan Government. Whether or not this is the beginning of an actual breakthrough in the peace negotiations before 2014 is yet unclear, just as it is highly probable that Pakistan will continue its support to certain insurgent groups after 2014.

The role of the international community in Afghanistan in the period after 2014 will be much more retracted and of an assisting and advisory nature – it will be for the Afghans to take the lead in all areas.

In military terms, NATO-led combat operations will no longer take place after 2014 – the NATO efforts will be deployed exclusively to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. Other coalition partners, particularly the US, are, however, expected to provide more forceful military contributions with capacities ranging beyond those of the NATO framework, including targeted counterterrorism initiatives. The exact framework for the NATO engagement in Afghanistan after 2014 is just beginning to take shape and is expected to be determined in the spring of 2013.

In the area of development, the role of the international community after 2014 will
be rooted in the pledges from Tokyo in 2012 of a long-term civilian engagement in Afghanistan during the critical years after 2014. In particular, the international community will continue the effort to increase Afghan capacity so that the Afghan Government becomes self-supporting and the dependence of Afghanistan on the international presence is reduced.

As for Denmark, it is determined that Denmark will have a long-term commitment in Afghanistan also after 2014, both in terms of security and development. This serving as point of departure, Denmark wishes to enter into a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan in early 2013.

The precise parameters of the Danish civilian and military engagement in Afghanistan after 2014 will be subject to negotiations during 2014 with the parties to this agreement. The engagement will be determined in light of developments throughout 2013-2014, and will equally have to be adjusted according to the NATO-led mission for the engagement after 2014. A potential Danish military presence beyond 2014 will be part of the framework of the NATO-led mission, and would, if deployed, be considerably reduced and consist of advisors, instructors and assistance to the Afghan security forces. Examples of Danish capacities, which could expectedly remain after 2014, are the contribution of instructors and planners to the Afghan National Army Officers Academy in Kabul, transport helicopters and other similar contributions.
In order to give Afghanistan the best possibilities to continue a peaceful development process after 2014, it is absolutely vital that the international community concentrates all efforts during 2013-2014 on preparing the Afghan authorities for this task. With the adoption of this Afghanistan Plan, Denmark has determined a clear and responsible Danish engagement in Afghanistan for the coming two critical years.

In light of specific needs and options, Denmark will likewise consider how a contribution to the training of the Afghan police can be made after 2014.

Denmark attaches a lot of weight to the development efforts after 2014, and these will have a more long-term perspective than the Danish military presence. As mentioned, Denmark aim to provide an annual average of DKK 530 million in development assistance until and including 2017, the Danish development assistance to Afghanistan will depend on whether the Afghan Government continuously demonstrates positive results and progress in fulfilling its commitments.
**Annex**

**Benchmarks for 2013-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE FOR THE SECURITY AND POLICE EFFORTS</th>
<th>Denmark will support the transfer of full security responsibility to the Afghan authorities before the end of 2014.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS</td>
<td>SPECIFIED BENCHMARKS FOR 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will contribute an infantry company, tanks and combat support units to Task Force Helmand.</td>
<td>Denmark has contributed to the British-led operations aimed at improving security in the vicinity of Gereshk in the Nahr-e-Saraj district. Denmark has contributed combat and support units, which have played a part in facilitating the execution of independent Afghan security operations where mentoring has been limited to the battalion level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark has contributed a tank unit to the British-led operations aimed at improving security in central Helmand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS</td>
<td>SPECIFIED BENCHMARKS FOR 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will contribute with a contingent of two police operational mentoring and</td>
<td>Denmark has contributed to the development of Afghan police units in Gereshk in the Nahr-e-Saraj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liaison teams to assist the training of police in the central part of the Helmand</td>
<td>district through two police operational mentoring and liaison teams and developments allow for a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>province.</td>
<td>gradual reduction of the Danish police training contribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will contribute with special operations forces to support the training of</td>
<td>Denmark has carried out military capacity building for Helmand Provincial Response Company and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Afghan special police force in Helmand province.</td>
<td>the Afghan unit is capable of conducting operations with support from advisors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will extend the deployment of a C-130 transport aircraft by three months</td>
<td>Denmark has contributed to air transport in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>until the end of March 2013.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will extend the deployment of the mobile air control centre in northern</td>
<td>Denmark has contributed to air traffic control in northern Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan by three months until the end of May 2013.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will deploy personnel to support the operation of the strategic airports in</td>
<td>Denmark has deployed 25 personnel to support the operation of the air bases in Kabul and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Provided that an acceptable framework can be identified, Denmark will deploy up to eight personnel to support the development of the agricultural sector in Helmand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS</th>
<th>SPECIFIED BENCHMARKS FOR 2013</th>
<th>SPECIFIED BENCHMARKS FOR 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will contribute to the establishment of the Afghan National Army Officers Academy in Kabul</td>
<td>Denmark has contributed to the development of the agricultural sector in Helmand. During the second half of 2013 Denmark has contributed personnel to an US agriculture development team.</td>
<td>Denmark has contributed to the development of the agricultural sector in Helmand. During the second half of 2013 Denmark has contributed personnel to an US agriculture development team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark may contribute to tactical troop transport in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Denmark has deployed a contingent of at least eight mentors and advisors to the Afghan National Army Officers Academy in Kabul.</td>
<td>Denmark has contributed at least eight mentors and advisors to the Afghan National Army Officers Academy in Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subject to the contribution being warranted, Denmark has contributed EH-101 transport helicopters beginning in mid 2014.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### MAIN OBJECTIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Denmark will make a contribution to governance and the provision of basic services becoming consolidated and being carried out with a significantly smaller international presence after 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS (UNTIL 2014)</th>
<th>SPECIFIED BENCHMARKS FOR 2013-2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will keep the Afghan government to its obligations from the Tokyo conference, including those concerning human rights and women’s rights.</td>
<td>Denmark has increased the proportion of assistance that is based on incentives by backing the movement of the World Bank towards more incentive-based assistance, so that a greater proportion of Danish assistance depends on tangible progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will work to achieve Afghan ownership and responsibility when it comes to prioritizing the use of development assistance.</td>
<td>By the end of 2014, 50 per cent of Danish donated funds are channelled through the Afghan national budget, and 80 per cent are aligned with Afghan priorities. Through avenues such as the New Deal dialogue, Denmark has encouraged other donors also to live up to the “on-budget” principles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will provide more focused assistance and primarily channel funds through Afghan authorities, multilateral trust funds and international organisations</td>
<td>The number of partners and projects in the Danish assistance to Afghanistan is markedly reduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will continue to normalize the assistance and focus on the national level.</td>
<td>Denmark has focused the Danish assistance on fewer and larger projects, which enjoy Afghan ownership. Where relevant, Denmark has furthermore worked towards a higher degree of common programming with like-minded donors, as, for instance, the Nordic countries and EU-members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The civilian presence in Helmand, including the PRT, has been phased out.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS
(UNTIL 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denmark will work to achieve closer collaboration between national and subnational Afghan authorities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark has urged the World Bank to give priority to the work to strengthen subnational governance and has provided financial assistance to this effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In addition to this, Denmark has stressed to Afghan authorities, including during yearly consultations with the Afghan Ministry of Finance, that it is necessary to ensure close collaboration between the government in Kabul and the local authorities, as well as channelled contributions to specific national Afghan programmes that promote this end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark has also supported capacity building of provincial authorities in Helmand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will work towards greater predictability in the assistance delivery, in order to, among other things, give Afghan authorities better planning conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark has restructured the assistance and moved from annual to multiannual appropriations for all major assistance programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will support the work of Afghan players to curb corruption and will continue to apply a zero tolerance policy to any misuse of Danish assistance funds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark has worked at a high political level to keep the Afghan Government to its commitment to actively combat corruption, just as Denmark has contributed to the development and implementation of recommendations on the issue of corruption. Denmark has followed up on reports of suspected corruption or irregularities in relation to management of the development assistance received, among other things, via the anti-corruption hotline of the Danish MFA. Denmark has an economics specialist responsible for continuous supervision of the management of Danish assistance funds posted to the Embassy in Kabul.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**MAIN OBJECTIVE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE**

Denmark will contribute to promoting economic growth and employment, especially in the agricultural and food sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS (UNTIL 2014)</th>
<th>SPECIFIED BENCHMARKS FOR 2013-2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will contribute to the progress towards a more modern production in the agriculture and food sector</td>
<td>Denmark has initiated a new programme, which focuses especially on the agriculture and food sector. Through this programme, Denmark has provided support for the improvement of production, processing and storage facilities. Additionally, Denmark has used the dialogue with the relevant Afghan ministries to highlight the potential in developing value chains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will work for better access to loans and local food markets.</td>
<td>Denmark has contributed actively to promoting the access to markets, production inputs and credit, among other things by providing support for the roll-out of new programmes within the agricultural sector in Helmand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focusing especially on young people, Denmark will support the development of a more qualified workforce in the agriculture and food sector.</td>
<td>Denmark has provided financial support for Afghan training and vocational education aimed at the agriculture and food industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS (UNTIL 2014)</td>
<td>SPECIFIED BENCHMARKS FOR 2013-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will support the development of areas within agricultural and food production with a high employment rate of women.</td>
<td>Denmark has supported special efforts aimed at increasing women’s employment possibilities in the area of agricultural and food production, and has contributed to the education of more women in the agricultural sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will work towards returned refugees and internally displaced persons being taken more into consideration in relation to the broader effort for growth and employment.</td>
<td>In its dialogue with Afghan authorities, Denmark has emphasized the importance of considering refugees and internally displaced persons when drafting the relevant national programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVE FOR EDUCATION</strong></td>
<td>Denmark will contribute to furthering a viable and Afghan-run education sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS (UNTIL 2014)</strong></td>
<td><strong>SPECIFIED BENCHMARKS FOR 2013-2014</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will support a sustainable and Afghan-run education sector</td>
<td>Denmark has promoted a sustainable and Afghan-run education sector through non-earmarked support for Afghanistan’s own national education strategy. As a leading donor in the sector, Denmark has encouraged other donors to increase their on-budget assistance with the aim of increasing Afghan ownership and donor harmonization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will continue to work for girls’ access to education and access to schools in remote areas.</td>
<td>In its dialogue with the Afghan Government, Denmark has worked for equal access to education for all children – emphasizing education for girls in particular – and put an emphasis on education quality, for instance by having encouraged measuring the skills of school children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will enhance the quality of education, which includes enhancing the relations between the education and employment sectors.</td>
<td>In its dialogue with the Afghan Ministry of Education, Denmark has urged that technical and vocational education be targeted to meet the needs of the businesses, which includes closer coordination with other Afghan authorities with responsibilities in this area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVE FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY</strong></td>
<td>Denmark will contribute to the promotion of good governance, democracy and respect for human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS (UNTIL 2014)</strong></td>
<td><strong>SPECIFIED BENCHMARKS FOR 2013-2014</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will contribute to the formation of a more efficient public administration, focussing efforts on financial management.</td>
<td>Through financial support to World Bank programmes, Denmark has contributed to the strengthening of public financial management and implementation of reforms in the public administration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark will support democratization processes, thereby creating better conditions for holding elections that are more free and fair.</td>
<td>Denmark has, for instance through the UN, supported capacity building in Afghan election institutions. Denmark has furthermore provided financial support for civil society spokesmanship in relation to the election system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark will continue to keep the Afghan Government to its human rights commitments.</td>
<td>Through financial support, Denmark has contributed to the strengthening of the spokesmanship and monitoring activities of Afghan human rights institutions. Through financial support and political backing to the civil society, Denmark has generated attention on rights. In addition, Denmark has raised specific matters as part of the political dialogue with the Afghan Government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark will continue to give high priority to the rights of women and children.</td>
<td>Denmark has provided political support for the enforcement of the law on violence against women, and has raised the attention of both Afghan institutions and international organisations to the need of focus on women’s rights. Additionally, Denmark has improved women’s access to legal assistance and women’s crisis centres through financial assistance to civil society.</td>
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<td>IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS (UNTIL 2014)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark will support the development and reform of the justice sector, including in Helmand.</td>
<td>Through financial support to World Bank programmes, Denmark has made a contribution to the implementation of reforms in the Ministry of Justice. And has – by posting advisors in 2013 – contributed to capacity building among players in the justice sector in Helmand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will continue to support the establishment and development of Afghan civil society organisations.</td>
<td>Denmark has contributed to capacity building in civil society organisations in such areas as, for instance, human rights and anti-corruption efforts, primarily through financial assistance to the multi-donor Tawanmandi trust fund.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVE FOR THE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS</strong></td>
<td><strong>IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS (UNTIL 2014)</strong></td>
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<td>Denmark will support the peace and reconciliation process, including its regional aspects and promotion of the role of women.</td>
<td>SPECIFIED BENCHMARKS FOR 2013-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will support the Afghan peace and reconciliation process through the work of the High Peace Council.</td>
<td>Based on the established criteria for reconciliation and reintegation, Denmark has provided financial and political support for the reconciliation process – mainly via the UN and multi-donor programmes that have delivered logistical and technical assistance, as well as national and local dialogue initiatives.</td>
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<td>Denmark will strengthen the focus on women’s involvement in the peace process.</td>
<td>In collaboration with the High Peace Council and a number of civil society organisations, Denmark has highlighted women’s rights and provided support for the implementation of an action plan for the inclusion of women in the reconciliation process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark will continue its support for reintegration of former insurgents, who choose to lay down their arms.</td>
<td>Denmark has played a part in expanding the possibilities for alternative income for former insurgents and has contributed to the development of the local communities that receive them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will support the regional dialogue on political and financial matters and the role of the UN in the promotion hereof.</td>
<td>Denmark has provided financial support to the implementation of UN initiatives, among others, aimed at generating confidence building of regional cooperation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVE CONCERNING RETURNED REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE EFFORTS</td>
<td>Denmark will contribute to sustainable solutions for returned and internally displaced persons, and the avoidance and alleviation of acute humanitarian crises.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS (UNTIL 2014)</td>
<td>SPECIFIED BENCHMARKS FOR 2013-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will contribute to assist sustainable reintegration of returned refugees and internally displaced persons, including through support to host societies.</td>
<td>Through its dialogue with the Afghan Government, Denmark has played a part in focusing political attention on the conditions of refugees and internally displaced persons, and has made a financial contribution to the improvement of living conditions, job opportunities, basic social services and housing of refugees.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark will focus on the refugee situation in urban areas.</td>
<td>Denmark has ensured that partners in humanitarian efforts consider including urban areas in the development of programmes and projects.</td>
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</table>

Please refer to more specified goals and indicators in the programme and project documents for the individual initiatives within the Danish assistance to Afghanistan.